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1. Introduction 
The financing of higher education is an extremely debated topic in many advanced countries. 
Typically, public contributions to higher education are justified on the grounds of the external effects 
of education benefiting society at large. Moreover, policies that foresee financial aid to foster 
university enrolment aim at persuading low-income families to invest in higher education for their 
children by reducing the costs connected to the university attendance, so that this kind of interventions 
are usually set in order to reduce or contain inequalities. 
Despite the considerable public spending for this kind of interventions, there is still a lack of 
knowledge toward the effects of financial aid that aim to incentivise university enrolment. Because of 
some contrasting results1, the empirical evidence so far has not been able to give a definitive answer 
about the effectiveness of financial assistance on university attendance in US, as well as in Europe. In 
Italy, where the participation in higher education has largely expanded in recent decades, the lack of 
knowledge is mainly due to the absence of this kind of policy. However, the introduction of the 
“Grant 5B”, a merit-based financial aid to students from low-income families, in the province of 
Trento (a well-defined area in the North-East of Italy) allows for the opportunity to assess the effects 
of this sort of programmes in order to fill up the knowledge gap. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of monetary incentives on the 
university enrolment decisions. More specifically, since the eligibility rules for the access to the Grant 
5B – merit and financial need – identify students eligible to the financial aid that are not comparable 
to the ineligibles, we employ a regression discontinuity design in order to solve the selection bias 
issue and to estimate the causal effects of the intervention on two different outcomes. We first study 
whether the university enrolment probability of students is affected by the eligibility to the Grant 5B, 
and, second, if there is a redirection of students already bound to university. In particular we analyse 
the choice of students enrolled in terms of the field of study, location and prestigious of the chosen 
university. This allows us to contribute to the literature of the optimal school choice, focusing on 
decisions made at the higher education level, as well as the related debate about the financing of 
university attendance and the choice of eligibility criteria for this kind of policies.  
Exploiting data resulting from an ad hoc survey conducted on a sample of upper secondary 
graduates – the target population of the programme – and administrative archives, we find that 
financial aid provided by the province of Trento has no effect on university enrolment probability, but 
it exerts large (about 40%) positive effect on the decision to enrol outside the place of residence, 
especially in fields of study not covered by the local university. Hence, we conclude that in 
educational policies aimed at boosting university enrolment, the choice of merit eligibility rule is far 
from negligible, because it may considerably affect the enrolment decisions of individuals and their 
families. As for the chosen university, our estimates show that, conditional on not being influenced in 
the enrolment decision by the monetary aid, eligibility rule affects the decision about the location and 
the field of study, allowing for a better match between the individual preferences and budget 
constraints.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the literature 
related to case studies of financial incentives and their effects on higher education participation. The 
third section highlights the main characteristics of the Italian educational system, and we present the 
                                                            
1 For a review of previous studies see Leslie and Brinkman (1988) and Heller (1997). A detailed review of 
recent studies on the effects of financial aid is presented in section 2. 
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Grant 5B and the context where this programme has been introduced. The fourth section is devoted to 
the illustration of the data and some descriptive results, while the fifth one explain the evaluation 
strategy. In the sixth section we show the main empirical results, and the last section is reserved for 
some conclusive remarks and policy implications. 
2. Evidence from previous studies 
The effects of family income and monetary incentives on optimal school choice and educational 
attainment have been issues of longstanding concern in social sciences and have been studied in the 
international literature both from theorists and empiricists. In the recent empirical literature there is a 
large amount of studies aimed at investigating the effects of financial assistance on university 
enrolment2, but their results do not always agree. In the following we present a review of some 
applied studies on the evaluation of educational programmes aimed to sustain the transition from 
secondary to tertiary education. We focus on interventions which have been introduced by national 
and local governments in different periods of time and with diverse peculiarities, such as the exact 
amount of the benefit or its duration. However, even though there is heterogeneity in programme 
rules, which may well lead to heterogeneity in the programmes’ effects, all of them are characterized 
by the fact that, first, they all allow a non-negligible reduction of the educational costs through 
financial transfers or tuition cuts, and, second, they assign incentives to students depending on their 
merit and/or financial need. 
Table 1 briefly summarizes the context, the kind of treatment and requirement of each considered 
intervention and reports their results in terms of effects on university attendance. There is a large 
amount of researches referred to the US, where educational costs are particularly high. Such as an 
example, Van der Klaauw (2002) studies the effects of college aid offers on student enrolment 
decisions and his findings show the importance of financial aid as an effective instrument in 
competing with other colleges for students. There is also some clear evidence that indicates that the 
student choices to enrol college responds positively to public financial transfers (Dynarski 2003), as 
well as fees reduction (Manski and Wise 1983; McPherson and Schapiro 1991; Kane 1994). Instead, 
Hansen (1983) does not find any significant effect of the American program BEOG on the access to 
higher education. These contrasting results are by no means peculiar to the US, since they follow a 
similar pattern in many European countries, where the cost of attending university is quite cheaper, 
despite some considerable heterogeneity. Lauer (2002) and Stenier and Wrohlich (2008) find that the 
monetary benefits positively raise the enrolment rates of German students, as well as Fredriksson 
(1997) and Nielsen et al. (2010) in Sweden and Denmark, respectively. But, as for the US, there are 
studies that find different conclusions in Europe too: in Germany Baumgartner and Steiner (2006), for 
instance, find a non significant effect of financial incentives on student decision of attending 
university. 
As a matter of fact, recently there has been a shift toward the programmes based on merit rather 
than financial need. The assessment of these policies suggest that they seem to be more effective, 
though the results are not conclusive. Studying the Georgia’s HOPE programme, Dynarski (2000) and 
Cornwell et al. (2006) report that merit based incentives have positive and significant effects on the 
probability of university enrolment. Oppositely, Binder and Ganderton (2002), exploiting data 
referred to a means-test policy set up in New Mexico also based on merit, find no empirical evidence 
                                                            
2 Also, there are some studies of the effects of public contributions on university completion and other measures 
of academic achievement. For an example and a review of previous studies see Belot et al. (2007). 
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that it boosted college attendance. Instead, they point out that the main remarkable effect of the 
programme appears to be a redirection of students already bound for college in different institutions 
and type of courses. Nevertheless, from the theoretical point of view, the debate about the merit based 
incentives is still open. Some scholars argue that these kind of incentives will favour well off students 
due to the strong correlation between social origins and educational attainment (Orfield 2002). 
 
Table 1 A review of studies that investigates the effects of financial aid on university enrolment decisions. 
Study Context (programme) Eligibility criteria Effect on university enrolment 
Baumgartner and Steiner (2006) Germany (BAFoeG) Financial need Non significant 
Binder and Ganderton (2002) US/New Mexico Merit and Financial need Non significant 
Cornwell et al. (2006) US/Georgia (HOPE) Merit Positive 
Dynarski (2000) US/Georgia (HOPE) Merit Positive 
Dynarski (2003) US (SSSBP) Financial need Positive 
Goodman (2008) US/Massachusetts Merit Positive 
Hansen (1983) US (BEOG/Pell) Financial need Non significant 
Kane (1994) US (BEOG/Pell) Financial need Positive 
Lauer (2002) Germany Financial need Positive 
Manski and Wise (1983) US (BEOG/Pell) Financial need Positive 
McPherson and Schapiro (1991) US Financial need Positive 
Nielsen et al. (2010) Denmark Financial need Positive 
Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) Germany (BAFoeG) Financial need Positive 
Van der Klaauw (2002) US/East-cost colleges Merit Positive 
 
Obviously, the central question in all these studies regards the efficacy of the financial aid. In order 
to answer to this question it is fundamental to understand how students and their families react to 
exogenous variation in the educational costs. In other words, we have to analyse the elasticity of the 
higher education demand of students. The idea of the researches reviewed is that there is a liquidity 
constraint that affects the decision to enrol in university. If this is true, a generous set of grants will 
foster the university enrolment reducing the direct and indirect costs of attendance. Several studies 
have found that there is a direct influence of family income on child’s attainment, although there is 
substantial variation in the strength of the identified relationship (for example see Mayer 1997, 
Hobcraft 1998, Gregg and Machin 2000, Levy and Duncan 2000, Houston et al. 2001, Clark-Kaufman 
et al. 2003). Such studies indicate that the negative effect of low income on children’s attainment is 
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still present even after controlling for family background and other key factors assumed to affect 
educational outcomes. Besides, economic models underlying the relationship between scholarship 
programmes and optimal school choice are straightforwardly derived from the standard human capital 
framework (Becker 1993, Griliches 1977), suggesting that financial aid programmes should increase 
overall university enrolment, though they allow a sub-optimal choice equilibrium (Dynarski 1999, 
Binder and Ganderton 2002). 
Heckman and colleagues (Cameron and Heckman 2001, Carneiro and Heckman 2002) challenge 
this approach arguing that the long-run family and environmental factors shape the ability and 
expectations of children. As a consequence, students from disadvantaged background do not enrol for 
a lack in abilities and not for liquidity constraints. This research strand suggests that financial aid is 
not effective and that it is necessary to intervene on children motivation during their school career, 
and, especially, on social origins when they are very young. Indeed, cognitive abilities are formed 
very early in life and it is more difficult intervene as children grow up (Heckman 2005, Cunha and 
Heckman 2009). Also the sociological literature stresses the leading role of social origins in 
influencing the educational outcomes (Shavit and Blossfled 1993, Shavit et al. 2007, Breen et al. 
2009).3 It is also possible that the scarce effectiveness of some programmes is due to some mistakes in 
the policy design and in particular in the targeted population. It could be the case that grants are 
directed to students that would have enrolled even in the absence of the programme.  
To sum up, the research on this topic produced controversial results and there is no empirical 
evidence for Italy.4 Our contribution is an attempt to understand how this kind of policies works in 
Italy and, moreover, we are also interested in understanding how financial incentives should affect the 
enrolment decision in terms of  redirection of students towards different locations or more prestigious 
institutions, in order to match their career and life preferences. On these grounds, our work, which 
attempts to evaluate the effects of the introduction of a grant for worthy and low-income students in 
an Italian province, is innovative.  
3. The introduction of the “Grant 5B” 
3.1. Context: the Italian education system and the province of Trento 
Nowadays in Italy there are three stages of education: primary, secondary and tertiary. In the 
Sixties, a set of reforms has been implemented in a way that made the Italian educational system more 
egalitarian, partially removing the tracking system. Indeed, currently, the only constraint that the 
Italian students have to face to access the university is to complete a five-years upper secondary 
school, and pass the so-called Esame di maturità, a leaving exam that students have to take at the end 
of upper secondary school. Passing the Esame di maturità allows the access to higher education 
regardless of the final score obtained, which is in a range between 60 and 100.5 This means that, if a 
student graduates from a five-years technical or vocational school, he could enrol in university. In any 
                                                            
3 The sociological literature do not address directly the effect of monetary incentives on the inequality structure, 
the interest lies much more in the trend of the association between social origins and educational outcomes. 
They found that this association is strong, but there is evidence that in the last decades it is declining. 
4 A partial exception is given by Garibaldi et al. (2011) which do not study the effects of financial aid on 
enrolment, but rather how the time to complete a degree should be affected by tuition fees reduction in a famous 
Italian institution 
5 Esame di maturità is composed by three written texts and an oral colloquium, which results weight on the final 
score for 45% and 35%, respectively (the remaining 20% depends on school career). More precisely, the first 
two written texts are decided by the Ministry of Education while the rest of the exam is school specific. The 
exam committee is formed by 4 out of 7 teachers of other schools. 
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case, there is a set of high schools – the so called licei – specifically devoted to prepare students for 
university. Recently, the higher education in Italy has been changed after the introduction of the so-
called “Bologna Process” in 2001. A sector of shorter vocational higher education (diplomi 
universitari) created in 1990s had been removed. The current Italian tertiary education is now based 
on a sequential 3+2 system, which comprises a 3-year bachelor, which awards the laurea triennale, 
and a 2-year master which leads to the laurea magistrale. 
 
Fig. 1. Italy and Trentino at a glance: some macro indicators 
a. Per capita GDP b. Family poverty rates 
c. Youth unemployment rates d. Enrolment rates at university 
Source: ISTAT (Italian Statistical Agency) and Province of Trento Statistical Office. 
 
Our research focuses on the access to higher education in the province of Trento, often referred as 
Trentino, a small area in the North-East of Italy. Trentino is a well-developed area, with a rather tight 
labour market and a per capita GDP about 20% higher than the national average. Figure 1 shows that 
this difference appears to be stable in the last decade (panel a), and this trend is mirrored in the rate of 
poor families, which is lower in Trentino than in the rest of Italy (panel b). This figure is consistent 
with the evidence that the level of income inequality is definitely lower for about 7% than in the 
whole country.6 Focusing on the youth, though the onset of 2009 economic crisis, labour market 
conditions are relatively favourable in the province of Trento (panel c). Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that, for Trentino students, the enrolment rate at university is higher than in the rest of Italy, 
                                                            
6 This indicator is measured by the Gini index using data from Survey on Household Income and Wealth (Bank 
of Italy) and Trentino Household Panel (Province of Trento Statistical Office). 
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however this difference tends to decrease (panel d). This means that in Trento area students and their 
families value education investments, although the outside option is good. In the last years, in 
Trentino, more than a half of upper-secondary graduates who decided to invest in higher education 
enrolled at the University of Trento (UniTN), which is the sole tertiary education institution in the 
province. Among Italian public universities, the UniTN is a really well-ranked university. It offers a 
large variety of courses, but fundamental schools, such as medicine and architecture, are still missing. 
As for the administrative and policy making perspective, Trento is an autonomous province, 
which means that it enjoys a large degree of autonomy7 in fields like welfare, health, and education. 
Combined with the public concern for the effects of the economic crisis, the autonomy leads the local 
government to play a leading role in sustaining poor families facing financial troubles. Since the 
government of Trento is particularly sensitive to educational issues, one of the dispositions is related 
with the participation in higher education.  
3.2. The Grant 5B 
In Autumn 2009 the local government assigns merit-based financial incentives to students from 
low income families. The introduction of such an intervention represents a major innovation at the 
local level but also in the context of the national educational grant system, since in Italy there is a lack 
of programme aiming to cover indirect costs of education given by the opportunity costs of working 
instead of studying. It is worth noting that the use of means-tested benefits represents an innovation in 
the field of transfer programs in Italy as well as Southern Europe. 
The Grant 5B was introduced after it emerged that there is a worrying negative trend in the 
enrolment rate (fig. 1, panel d) together with a persistence of inequalities between social classes8 (fig. 
2). Indeed, in the last three years the enrolment rate falls from about 74% to 67% together with a class 
polarization between upper (service class and routine nonmanual) and other classes (working class 
and self-employed). Setting up this programme, local policy makers intend to reverse the negative 
trend in the enrolment rate and at the same time to reduce inequalities between social classes. 
The monetary aid is awarded upon both the demonstrated financial need and the merit of students. 
Specifically, the scholarship is paid to those who have successfully completed the last year of 
secondary school (Esame di maturità) obtaining a final score which fall above 93/100 and whose 
family equivalent income is below a certain threshold, set around € 30,000.9 In addition, students are 
expected to have been residing in Trentino for at least 3 years. 
The amount of benefit varies depending on the family income and geographic location of the 
chosen university. Students enrolling in universities located within the province of Trento are entitled 
to financial aid ranging from € 1,200 to € 4,800 per year; while students enrolling in universities 
                                                            
7 Because of historical and cultural reasons, in order to guarantee autonomy the Italian Constitution recognizes 
five autonomous regions, and only in one of these there are two autonomous provinces, which one is Trentino. 
8 Social class is build according to the European Socio-economic Classification (Rose and Harrison 2010) and is 
based on the employment relations characterising different groups of similar occupations. We identify four 
social classes: a) Salariat: large employers, higher grade professional and managerial occupations; b) White 
collar: clerical and administrative occupations; c) Petite bourgeoisie: small employer and self-employed 
occupations; d) Working class: skilled and non-skilled manual occupations. 
9 This predetermined threshold is measured by an ad hoc index called Icef which summarize incomes and assets 
of each family using a certain scale of equivalence that is not far from to the OECD one. But, since it takes into 
account family components assets as well as income, the interpretation of this indicator is far from 
straightforward. However, a family with € 30,000 of equivalent income measured by Icef is not a proper “poor” 
family, since the sixty percent of the median incomes in the Province of Trento is around € 8.300. 
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outside the province and moving there are offered scholarships from € 1,800 up to € 6,000 per year. 
However, table 2 reveals that more than 80% of Grant 5B recipients receive an amount larger than € 
4,500 per year, which means a monthly scholarship in the range € 375–500. 
The monetary aid is renewable upon determining whether or not a student is still eligible to qualify 
for help from the programme. Furthermore, the programme works as a generous top-up of the 
ordinary schemes implemented by universities to cover direct costs of education (tuition, 
accommodation, teaching material, etc.). The total expenditure for the first year of the introduction of 
the programme amounts to some € 630.000. 
 
Table 2. Amount of Grant 5B 
Amount per year (€)  N       % 
Less than 1.500 5 4 
1.501 – 3.000 7 5 
3.001 – 4.500 10 8 
4.501 – 6.000 111 83 
    Total 133 100 
 
Fig. 2.  Enrolment rate according to parental social class, Trentino (2004-2009) 
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Source: Survey on the secondary schools graduates in Trentino, University of Trento 
 
4. Data and descriptive evidence 
We exploit data resulting from the linkage between the archives of Opera Universitaria – the 
agency in charge of the administration of the programme – and an ad hoc survey administered  to 
gather information for the quantitative evaluation of the programme. Data collection has been carried 
out by IRVAPP and University of Trento. The questionnaire were administered by CATI (Computer-
Assisted Telephone Interviewing) and CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing) procedures.  
The reference population consists of the 3,168 high school graduates in Trentino for the year 
2008/2009 who could enrol at the university in the academic year 2009/2010. The aim of the survey is 
censual and we were able to interview 2,744 students with a high response rate (87%). We gathered 
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information about: a) Socio-demographic characteristics (gender, family size, geographic area of 
residence, age); b) Social origins (parental social class, parental education, economic resources, 
parental support); c) School career (school type, final score at Esame di maturità, final score at 
Licenza media10).  
Table 3 reports information about the enrolment rate at the university for the high school graduates 
in Trentino. It emerges that about 39% of the enrolled students decides to attend universities outside 
Trento and a huge proportion of these students choose schools absent from UniTN. It is interesting to 
notice how, on average, they choose locations that are not too far from Trento (fig. 3). Indeed more 
than 60% of the students outside Trento move to an university located in a radius of 150 km.11 
 
Table 3. Enrolment rate at university 
             N % % % Grant 5b recipients 
Total graduates a.s. 2008/09 2,737 100.0    
Not enrolled 821 30.0    
Enrolled at University 1,916 70.0 100.0  133 
    in Trento 1,172  61.2  75 
    outside Trento 744  38.8 100.0 58 
in schools absent from Trento  483   66.6 40 
in school present in Trento 242   33.4 18 
 
Fig. 3. Enrolment locations outside Trento. 
 
Note: Trento is marked by the blue-squared dot .  
                                                            
10 More precisely, Esame di maturità and Licenza media are exit exams. The first is at the end of the high 
school, while the second concludes the lower secondary school. 
11 This measure correspond to about 93 miles.  
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In general the higher educational demand in Trentino follows what is known in literature (Brand 
and Xie 2010) and that the main factors that could influence the enrolment probability are: social 
origins, parental style, family structure and school career.12 An interesting point emerges if we 
consider the interaction between social class and the final score obtained at the Esame di maturità. 
Indeed, figure 4 shows that the class differences in the enrolment behaviour tend to disappear once the 
final score is considered. In particular, working class children with high scores behave similarly to the 
offspring of other social classes. As a consequence, we have that the so called risk aversion (Breen 
and Goldthorpe 1997; Checchi et al. 2008) is weak for pupils from disadvantaged background but 
with a high school achievement. Our empirical analysis for Trentino shows that the disadvantaged 
families will tend to invest in higher education if their children go well at school. This evidence is 
Trentino specific: in the rest of Italy we do not observe this reduction in inequalities. In fact, in the 
rest of the country the distance between social classes remains constant even after controlling for the 
final score at Esame di maturità.13 
 
Fig. 4. Enrolment rate according to social class and final score at Esame di maturità14 (N=2458). 
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
E
nr
ol
m
en
t r
at
e
60 70 80 90 93 100
Final score
Salariat White collar
Petite bourgeoisie Working class
Social class
 
5. Evaluation strategy 
In this paper we refer to the so-called counterfactual model of causality.15 The primary goal of the 
causal analysis is the investigation of selected effects of a particular cause rather than the search for 
all possible causes of a particular outcome (Morgan and Harding 2006). The approach foresees the 
effect of the programme is evaluated as the difference between the individual behaviours after the 
introduction of the policy compared to what would have been happened in the absence of this 
programme. 
                                                            
12 The analysis are available from the authors on request. 
13 Schizzerotto and Barone (2006) finds for Italy that there is any reduction in the distances between the 
different social classes also controlling for marks. 
14 The graph represents the interaction between the final score and social class on the all sample (even if for 279 
students information about social class is missing). Figure 2 has been build using the Stata routine predxcon 
(http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s402602.html). 
15 The counterfactual model of causality is widespread in the social sciences. See for example: Heckman et al. 
(1999), Pearl (2000), Shadish et al. (2002), Morgan and Winship (2007), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 
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Throughout the remainder of this paper we follow the notation of the potential outcome approach 
to causal inference16, except for an important distinction: in our case study the ‘treatment’ is not 
receiving the Grant 5B, but the ‘eligibility’ to it. Therefore let E be the binary variable denoting the 
eligibility status indicator, with E=1 for those students eligible to the cash transfer and E=0 
otherwise, and (Y1, Y0) be the two potential outcomes that would be realized whether the student is 
eligible and if the student is not, respectively. In the context of this paper, Y1 and Y0 represent higher 
education enrolment decisions so that they can stand for university attendance, location and prestige 
of the chosen university, corresponding to the students being eligible and ineligible, respectively. The 
causal effect of the eligibility to the Grant 5B on enrolment decisions is then defined as the difference 
between these outcomes, Y1 − Y0 , which is not observable at the individual level since being eligible 
reveals Y1 but conceals Y0. Indeed, though Y1 and Y0 are potentially observable and since a certain 
student can either being eligible or ineligible but not both, only one of these two potential outcomes 
can be realized. As a result, if a student is eligible to claim the aid (E=1), then Y1 will be realized and 
Y0 will (ex post) be a counterfactual outcome and vice versa. Accordingly, though not observable, Y1 
− Y0 represents the change in the propensity to decide whether to enrol and attend a university with 
certain characteristics, corresponding to a change in the eligibility status of the student and his/her 
family, which is our quantity of interest. 
Since Y1 − Y0 is likely to vary across individuals and observing both Y1 and Y0 for the same 
individual is impossible, there is no way to pin down the individual causal effect of being eligible to 
the aid.17 Hence, following the statistic and econometric literature on programme evaluation, we focus 
on average causal effects for the subpopulation of individuals actually eligible to the financial aid 
defined as E[Y1−Y0|E=1], the so-called Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).  
Notwithstanding, it is straightforward to obtain the following identity: 
E[Y1 |E=1] – E[Y0 |E=0] = E[Y1 − Y0|E=1] + {E[Y0 |E=1] − E[Y0 |E=0]} 
where the observable difference between the mean outcome experienced by the eligible group and the 
mean outcome experienced by the comparison group is decomposed into two terms: the first one is 
the ATT, and the second term is the selection bias induced by the differential composition of the two 
groups with respect to the eligibility condition. Hence in the observable difference between eligible 
students and those students who do not have access to the programme, we need to disentangle the 
causal effect of being eligible to the aid from the effect of the different composition of the two groups. 
In our case study, in order to be eligible, students must have obtained very good results at Esame 
di maturità and come from low-income families. It is widely known that merit and income influence 
the enrolment decisions. As a consequence, the difference in the enrolment propensity and preferences 
between eligible and ineligible could remain even in the absence of the programme. To solve this 
problem we should consider that the eligibility depends on administrative rules that identify two 
threshold of assignment criteria (merit and financial need). As a consequence, a discontinuity in the 
treatment is determined, because only students with the final score above 93/100 and from families 
with an equivalent income below € 30,000 are eligible, while other students are excluded. The more 
                                                            
16 See Rubin (1974), Heckman (1979) and Holland (1986) for a deeper explanation of the potential outcome 
approach. 
17 Holland (1986) refers to this issue as “the fundamental problem of causal inference”. 
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suitable identification strategy consists in comparison between the enrolment rates around the 
threshold values. This strategy is known as Regression Discontinuity Design (Rdd in what follows).18  
The basic idea underlying Rdd is that a little change in the assignment variables, should not have 
significant impacts on the individuals’ behaviours. Indeed, in our case, albeit the final score depends 
also on the previous scholastic career and so that is a determinant of the enrolment decisions, it is 
feasible to suppose that slightly variations in the score (one-two points) are not influential. As a 
consequence, we could compare subjects immediately below and just above a given threshold, 
because we can consider them equivalent excepted for the eligibility to the treatment. In the case of 
the Grant 5B, we have two different threshold and so that we have to deal with four subpopulations 
(Table 3): 
- Eligible group: students with a mark above or equal to 93/100 and income lower € 30,000. 
- A control group: individuals with a final score below 93/100 and income lower € 30,000. 
- B control group: subjects with a mark of at least 93/100 and income above € 30,000. 
- C control group: those with a final score below 93/100 and income above € 30,000€. 
 
Table 4. Subpopulations for the high school graduates academic year 2008/09 
 
Final score on Esame di maturità 
≥ 93 < 93 
In
co
m
e ≤ € 30,000 
Eligible group 
(N=182) 
A control group 
(N=1,121) 
> € 30,000 
B control group 
 (N=14) 
C control group 
 (N=96) 
 
In such cases, it is possible to exploit all the control groups that arise from the double assignment 
criterion (Rosenbaum 1987).19 Unfortunately, we have completed data only for a representative 
sample of students from low-income families, that are the eligible and the A control groups (table 4). 
As a consequence, the only meaningful comparison that we can perform is around the merit requisite 
so that, henceforth, we focus our analysis on 1.303 students below the income threshold.20 
In this case, the algebraic difference between the sample mean of the enrolment rate immediately 
below and just above the mark threshold provides an unbiased estimate of the effects of the Grant 5B. 
Let S be the variable denoting the score at Esame di maturità and values S=93+ and S=93− denoting 
individuals marginally above and marginally below S=93, respectively, so that an unbiased estimate 
of the mean causal effect is provided by the empirical counterpart of  
E[Y1 |E=1, S=93+] – E[Y0 |E=0, S=93−] 
that is the ATT at the 93 threshold. 
                                                            
18 For recent development regarding Rdd see Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). Rdd 
was developed in the Sixties by (Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960) but it experienced a renew interest only in 
the last decade (especially since the seminal contribute of Hahn et al. 2001). For a review of the usage of Rdd in 
the social sciences see Cook (2008). 
19 More precisely, Battistin and Rettore (2008) and Lee (2008) are examples that consider more than one control 
group. Usually, with more control groups scholars produce separated analyses for every assignment variables 
even if it possible to conduct Rdd with multiple assignment variables jointly considered.  
20 See the appendix for a deeper discussion of the validity of this choice. 
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As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) point out, the drawback of the identification strategy considered is 
that Rdd has a limited degree of external validity, which means that if the programme’s impact is 
heterogeneous across students, as it likely to be in most cases, then it just allows to identify the causal 
effect for individuals around the threshold. Nevertheless, Rdd ensures the internal validity of the 
estimates. In fact, Rdd could be seen as a local randomized experiment, because around the threshold 
it creates a situation similar to a social experiment (Lee and Lemieux 2010, p. 289). 
The condition for this result to hold is that the conditional expectation E[Y0 | S] is a continuous 
function of the final score determining, in the case at hand, the eligibility condition, especially in the  
neighbourhood of S=93, that is the classic sharp Rdd identifying restriction, which will be maintained 
throughout the remainder of this paper. Indeed, though not observable for eligible students, there is no 
reason to believe that E[Y0 | S] is not continuous, since there are no other enrolment incentives based 
on this threshold value. Hence, we can impute any differences at the threshold to the introduction of 
the Grant 5B. However, following McCrary (2008) in section 6.3 we carry out a test to validate this 
assumption: the underlying idea is that a sufficient condition for the continuity of the E[Y0 | S] is that 
individual densities of the eligibility-determining variable are smooth. In the case considered here, 
this  implies that there is no way for students and their teachers to manipulate the final score at Esame 
di Maturità and as long as their control over the score is imprecise, eligibility condition is randomized 
around the threshold. 
6. Empirical results 
In a Rdd setting the goal is to verify the existence of a possible discontinuity around the threshold 
attributable to the programme. Then, as for the estimation perspective, the idea is to model the 
outcome variable considering the final score. Following the recent development in Rdd (Hahn et al. 
2001; Imbens and Lemieux 2008), in order to estimate the conditional expectations in samples around 
the threshold, the main approach is to use Local Linear Regression (henceforth Llr). The basic idea 
underlying the Llr is to run simple linear regressions allowing for different slopes of the regression 
function in the neighbourhood of the threshold. In this vein, assuming that a similar pattern 
characterizes outcomes as a function of population, a simple comparison for the mean predicted value 
just above and below the threshold provides an unbiased estimate of the causal effects of being 
eligible to claim the Grant 5B on outcomes related to university enrolment decisions. 
6.1. The effect on university enrolment 
To start with, we consider enrolment at the university as the first outcome. Let Y be the variable 
taking value 1 if a student is enrolled at the university 0 if she/he does not so that E[Y|S=s] represents 
the mean enrolment rate at the university for students with a final score of s. Panel a in figure 5 clearly 
shows actual and fitted values for E[Y|S=s]. It is straightforward to see that just above and below the 
threshold, fitted expected values of the transition rates are substantially identical. The results is also 
confirmed by the perfect overlapping of the two confidence intervals for the fitted values (marked by 
the grey area). 
As a consequence, since Rdd allows to disentangle the effect of the programme from other 
confounding factors, we can conclude that there is no impact of the eligibility to the Grant 5B on 
university enrolment decisions. In different words, we can affirm that the aim of the policy makers to 
boost higher education participation has not been reached, because the target population is made up of 
students who would have enrolled at the university even in the absence of the Grant 5B. 
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This result – combined with the empirical evidence that worthy students’ families are inclined to 
invest in tertiary education regardless their social-economic background – seems to suggest that the 
programme does not work, because it has been addressed to the wrong target population. Indeed, for 
students with a score at Esame di maturità of at least 93/100, liquidity constraints are definitely not an 
issue in the decision to enrol at university. 
However, it should be possible that monetary incentives affect other decisions about university 
attendance, which means that students already bound for university can be redirected by the eligibility 
to the Grant 5B. Although liquidity constraints do not affect university enrolment decision, financial 
aids can affect students’ behaviour allowing a better match with their preferences regarding the 
location of the chosen university, its prestige, or field of study. Thus, in the following, we try to move 
the policy makers’ goalpost to study other possible effects, basically, which have not been expected in 
Grant 5B design and implementation. 
 
Fig. 5. The effects of the Grant 5B, Llr estimates 
a. University attendance: enrolment rate (N=1.303) 
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6.2. The effects on redirecting students already bound for university 
Since monetary transfer provided by the Grant 5B cannot foster university participation, enrolled 
students are not a selected subsample of the population of graduate students entitled to enrol at 
university. Thus, we can focus on the 985 enrolled students below the income threshold to study the 
effects of the Grant 5B on their enrolment decisions without any loss of generality.  
Following previous results mentioned above about the effects of financial aid to students, we 
further replicate the Rdd in order to investigate the effects of the programme in redirecting students 
already bound for university in different locations. Now, let Y be the variable summing up the 
location of the chosen university: it takes value 0 if the student is enrolled at the University of Trento 
and 1 if she/he is enrolled outside Trento. This leads to define E[Y|S=s] as the mean enrolment rate at 
universities located outside Trento, conditioning on s. 
From our analysis, it clearly emerges that monetary incentives favour the decision to enrol outside 
Trento (fig. 5, panel b). In fact, the predicted values of the enrolment rate outside Trento at the 
threshold are dramatically higher (about 40%) for eligible students than for ineligibles. This means 
that, albeit the eligibility to the Grant 5B does not affect the enrolment rate, it gives the chance to 
move outside Trento, solving potential mismatch problems between preferences and economic 
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constraints. A straightforward explanation is that eligible students see a conspicuously reduction in 
the moving costs and they have the possibility to follow their preferences with less constraints.  
We do not model choices directly, but we try to provide evidence in favour of the leading 
characteristics of the chosen university comparing enrolled eligible and ineligible students in the Rdd 
setting described above. Indeed, considering that monetary aids should permit to widen the alternative 
options, students eligible to the Grant 5B are more likely to choose a course or a school that is not 
present at the University of Trento or that perform better in the national rankings. 
Exploiting data related to the absence of the faculty which has been chosen by freshmen, it clearly 
emerges that eligible students decide to enrol outside Trento in order to attend schools or faculties that 
are not present at UniTN, such as Medicine, Veterinary science and Pharmacy. The fitted values of 
the enrolment rate in schools absent from UniTN (in panel a of fig. 6) for eligible students is some 
42% higher than for ineligibles to the Grant 5B. The Rdd applied to the distance between Trento and 
the chosen university shows that, on average, there is a barely significant impact of less than 50 Km. 
This result is coherent with the fact that students enrolled at university from the province of Trento do 
not choose to attend institutions far away from their hometowns (fig. 6, panel b).21 
 
Fig. 6. Redirection: Llr estimates (enrolled students, N=985) 
a. Schools absent from UniTN 
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21 This result confirm the descriptive evidence emerging from figure 3. 
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Furthermore, we also investigate whether the decision to enrol outside Trento is fostered by the 
chance to attend top universities according to the national rankings.22 Panel c of figure 6 clearly shows 
that the eligibility for the financial aid does not shift choices towards more prestigious schools, since 
the estimated impact is negative (less than .2 score points), though not significant. A possible 
explanation is due to the fact that that UniTN performs very well in the national rankings with a set of 
schools (Sociology, Law and Natural Sciences) at the first place in the schools rankings considered 
here. A similar result is shown by the impact of the programme on the measure of the cost-of-living 
provided by the mean price to rent a room in the city of the chosen university. In this case the impact 
is positive but not significant as well. 
To sum up, we can stress that, even though financial aid do not foster university attendance, the 
Grant 5B has a clear effect in redirecting students already bound for university to attend schools 
which are not present at UniTN. 
6.3. Testing Rdd assumption 
As just mentioned, in Rdd a sufficient condition for the continuity of the potential outcome in 
absence of the programme is that it is no possible to manipulate the score variable. Testing this 
assumption is indispensable to demonstrate that in the absence of the treatment there would have not 
been any discontinuities on the threshold (McCrary 2008). The McCrary test is relevant in our setting, 
indeed, the threshold value (93/100) was known by students and teacher before the assignment of the 
final mark. Anyway, there’s no room to think that a manipulation of the final score takes place. 
Indeed, in figure 7, it is possible to notice a slight discontinuity on the threshold, but this jump is not 
statistically significant neither for the target population overall, nor for the enrolled students. 
Furthermore there are larger jumps at different values (e.g. 70, 80, 100).  For this reason we can retain 
our estimates of the effects of the Grant 5B unbiased. 
 
Fig. 7. McCrary test: manipulation of the score variable, Llr estimates 
a. All students below the income threshold (N=1,303) 
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6.4. Robustness checks 
In the previous subsections we presented Llr estimation results obtained with epanechnikov kernel 
and implementing the optimal bandwidth choice algorithm suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
                                                            
22 We gather data about the prestigious of each school in the chosen university, measured by an Italian very 
widespread ranking published every year and advertised by national media, i.e. the Censis Guide from La 
Repubblica newspaper (CENSIS 2008). 
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(2010). However, in order to check the robustness of these results, we try different bandwidths and 
exploit the use of different kind of kernel function to weight local polynomial. Appendix B shows 
that, though slight changes in the estimates of the ATT at the threshold and in their standard errors 
probably due to the relatively few observations in a local neighbourhood of s=93, conclusions about 
the effects of the Grant 5B do not change. 
Moreover, we carried out parametric estimation of the effect through the specification of two linear 
probability models, one for the eligible and one for the ineligible students below and above the 
threshold, respectively (table 4). The parametric approach leads to conclusion about significance of 
the estimates which are not different from what we have obtained non-parametrically. To ensure that 
findings are not driven by functional form assumptions, we run estimates with various covariates 
specifications, and with non-linear models (logit and probit). We conclude that results are not sensible 
to different estimation strategies, hence we can retain that the results presented in the previous 
sections 6.1 and 6.2 are robust. 23 
 
Table 5. The effects of the Grant 5B, parametric estimates 
 N ATT estimate Std. Er. 
Effects on enrolment decisions:     
university attendance: enrolment rate 1,303 0.01 0.095  
university location: enrolment rate outside Trento 985 0.40*** 0.109 
Preferences on enrolment decisions:   
schools absent from UniTN 985 0.45*** 0.092 
distance  from Trento 985 46.05** 19.860 
normalised prestige score 985 -0.03** 0.012 
rent for a room 985 41.11 40.010 
***:p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10 
7. Concluding remarks 
Monetary aids could be an important tool to weaken the influence of the social background on the 
tertiary education and to make it accessible to the students that otherwise would not consider the 
possibility to enrol at the university. In our research we study the effects of the introduction of the 
Grant 5B in the province of Trento, which provides merit-based financial aids for students from low-
income families, and we find two main results. First of all, despite to a considerable reduction of 
indirect costs connected to university attendance, the programme does not bear an effect on the 
enrolment rate. Nevertheless, it exerts a remarkable influence on the moving decision, since students 
who are eligible to receive the monetary incentive choose to attend an institution outside their place of 
residence. 
The null effect on the enrolment decision could be a sign of the absence of liquidity constraint and, 
as a consequence, of the presence of the long-run family effects advocated by Heckman and 
colleagues. At the same time, it is possible this policy has not been design properly. More precisely, 
                                                            
23 Our estimates are also robust to different sample stratification (kind of secondary school attended, parental 
education, social class, economic condition). The analysis are available from the authors on request. 
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the programme is addressed to a target population who would have enrolled at the university in the 
absence of the Grant 5B as well. Indeed, we show that the difference in the enrolment rate between 
the various social classes surprisingly decline when the marks increase. This means that worthy 
students and their families are willing to invest in higher education even if they come from 
disadvantage background. In other words, we find that the risk aversion for low-income families is 
very low. Maybe the outstanding results of their offspring are a good signal of the future academic 
success. 
Thus, in order to improve the effectiveness of the programme one solution could be the reduction 
of the final score threshold in order to favour the enrolment of students that otherwise would not go to 
university. In fact, if the aim is to increase the enrolment, the policy has to be focused on students 
who are not highly inclined to go to the university, and the most problematic students are those of the 
working class. For this reason, a policy recommendation could be to target financial incentives to 
students from “true” low-income families. Therefore, in this particular case, since also middle-income 
students are eligible to the scholarship, we suggest to reduce the financial threshold, together with the 
merit constraint, to improve policy efficacy. 
As for the interpretation of the second outcome, the effect on redirecting students already bound 
for university, we find a remarkable effect of the Grant 5B. So, even though financial aid is not able to 
foster enrolment, they influence the choice of university. Specifically, empirical evidence shows that 
eligible students tend to study at university located outside the province of Trento, in schools which 
are not present at UniTN. This means that, thanks to the monetary incentives provided, eligible 
students can take decisions about the choice of the university and school to attend, without limitations 
given by budget constraints. This evidence deserve more attention and in future researches we plan to 
investigate the determinants of university enrolment decisions with particular attention in order to take 
into account the characteristics of the students’ potential choices.  
 
Appendix A 
In this appendix we handle with the problem of missing values on the income variable. As reported 
in note 9, the economic condition of the year 2009 is measured by the Icef index and we do not have 
the Icef 2009 information for more than the half of the sample. In order to avoid a sample selection 
we linked to the individuals the Icef concerning the year 2008 as well.24 The difference between Icef 
2008 and 2009 (for those subjects both data are available) are barely noticeable (fig. A1) and it is 
almost zero around the income threshold. 
The non-response rate remains quite large also after this imputation (48.8%). We believe that 
people with high income and with a good economic condition do not present the Icef documentation, 
because they are aware of their non eligibility. To test this assumption, we model the non-response 
rate in order to understand if the data is missing at random. If our assumption is credible, we can 
conclude that our sample is representative for the population under the Icef threshold. 
It emerges (table A1) that there is quite a clear pattern in the missing values. More precisely, we 
find that the more disadvantage families (in terms of class and education) are more likely to present 
the Icef documentation. The same is true for the larger families and for families in which one parent is 
                                                            
24 For this operation we exploit an administrative database supplied by Clesius, the agency in charge of the 
calculation of Icef. 
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missing. In general, we have that the missing values are more concentrated in the richer strata of the 
population. This result confirm the validity of our evaluation study (section 5), indeed we consider 
only students from low-income families for which we have all the relevant information. Moreover, the 
results in table A1 show that disadvantages families tend to present the Icef documentation and this 
imply that our sample for low-income families is representative. 
 
Table. A1. Logistic regression for the probability of submit Icef: point estimates and standard errors 
 Coeff. S.E. 
   
Constant  -0.336**    0.154 
   
Parental social class   
  Salariat (ref.)    
  White collar  0.202*     0.124 
  Petite bourgeoisie -0.487**    0.172 
  Lower white collar  0.559***    0.160 
  Working class  0.373**    0.151 
   
Parental education   
  University (ref.)   
  Upper secondary  0.458***    0.134 
  Lower secondary  0.715***     0.153 
  Primary  0.881*    0.530 
   
Family size   
  One-two (ref.)   
  Three  0.440***    0.108 
  More than three  0.544***    0.132 
   
Type of family   
  Only one parent (ref.)   
  Both parents -0.863***    0.140 
   
Type of school   
  Non academic (ref.)   
  Academic  0.300***    0.090 
   
Pseudo-R2=0.04 
N=2,401 
***:p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10 
 
 
 
Fig. A1. Icef comparison between 2008 and 2009 (the income threshold is marked by the vertical line). 
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Appendix B 
Because different bandwidth choices can produce different estimates, in this appendix we carry out a 
sensitivity analysis to show that estimates presented in section 6 are robust to different bandwidth 
specification. For each outcome considered, figure A.2 shows Rdd estimates using twice and half the 
bandwidth used in the main results and the same kernel. 
Fig. A2. Sensitivity analysis: twice and half the bandwidth used in section 6. 
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Fig. A2. (continue) 
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